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ABSTRACT
This article reports on a workshop held to explore the potential
uses of operational earthquake forecasting (OEF). We discuss
the current status of OEF in the United States and elsewhere,
the types of products that could be generated, the various po-
tential users and uses of OEF, and the need for carefully crafted
communication protocols. Although operationalization chal-
lenges remain, there was clear consensus among the stakehold-
ers at the workshop that OEF could be useful.
INTRODUCTION
Operational earthquake forecasting (OEF) involves the dis-
semination of authoritative information about time-dependent
earthquake probabilities over time scales of hours to decades,
with the goal of informing the decisions that people and or-
ganizations make to mitigate seismic risk (Jordan and Jones,
2010; Jordan et al., 2011; Marzocchi, Jordan, and Woo, 2015).
In other words, OEF provides real-time forecasts to help com-
munities prepare for earthquakes. The usefulness of OEF has
been questioned in the literature (Peresan et al., 2012; Wang
and Rogers, 2014), with a rebuttal provided by Jordan et al.
(2014). This article contributes to that discussion by summa-
rizing the findings of a two-day workshop held March 2015 at
the United States Geological Survey (USGS) Powell Center in
Fort Collins, Colorado. The gathering involved discussions
among a variety of potential users and model developers (see
Acknowledgments) in an effort to identify potential uses of OEF
and to examine lessons learned from recent earthquakes and best
practices regarding effective communication. Although the goal
of the Powell Center project is to deploy at least a prototype OEF
system for California, the discussions and developments are more
widely applicable, including to areas of induced seismicity (e.g.,
Ellsworth, 2013; Petersen et al., 2015).
CURRENT STATUS OF OEF
The USGS initiated OEF efforts in the 1980s, with foreshock
alerts as part of the Parkfield Earthquake Prediction Experi-
ment (Bakun et al., 1987; Parkfield Working Group, 1993),
two earthquake advisories issued in conjunction with the State
of California prior to the Loma Prieta earthquake (U.S. Geo-
logical Survey Staff, 1990), and aftershock and foreshock alerts
based on the Reasenberg and Jones (1989) model, which esti-
mates earthquake probabilities based on empirical Omori–
Utsu and Gutenberg–Richter statistics. The Reasenberg and
Jones model has been used to generate automated alerts follow-
ing moderate earthquakes in California and for advisories is-
sued by an ad hoc process after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the
2010 Maule, Chile, earthquake, the 2010 El Mayor–Cucapah,
Mexico, earthquake, the 2011 Mineral Springs, Virginia, earth-
quake, and the 2015 Gorkha, Nepal, earthquake. The short-term
earthquake probability (STEP) model of Gerstenberger et al.
(2005) added spatial information and hazard to the Reasenberg
and Jones model; the USGS produced STEP forecasts for Cali-
fornia for several years but discontinued these postings in 2010
due to maintenance issues. Improving OEF capabilities is an iden-
tified strategic goal of the USGS (Holmes et al., 2012; pp. 32)
with two current foci. The first effort is automating the Reasen-
berg and Jones process for regions outside of California. The sec-
ond effort involves combining the epidemic type aftershock
sequence (ETAS) model (Ogata, 1988), which takes into account
secondary aftershock sequences, with long-term earthquake prob-
abilities. Combining short- and long-term forecasts was first done
with the foreshock model of Agnew and Jones (1991), but that
model was limited to forecasting only the largest events (see Mi-
chael, 2012, for a general discussion). The new approach, discussed
below, aims to provide consistent forecasts over the full range of
magnitudes and over a wide range of time scales. These efforts
have been endorsed by the National Earthquake Prediction
Evaluation Council (NEPEC), which advises theUSGS on earth-
quake prediction research priorities (see Data and Resources).
Workshop attendees also reported on recent experiences
and current capabilities of OEF in Italy (Marzocchi et al.,
2014), developed following the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake,
and in New Zealand, deployed during the 2010–2011 Canter-
bury sequence (Gerstenberger et al., 2014). The Italian system
forecasts both event probabilities and ground-motion hazard
for various time intervals, based on an ensemble of two ETAS
models and a version of the STEP model. This OEF is contin-
uously delivered by Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcan-
ologia (INGV) to the Department of Civil Protection, and
they are presently working with communication experts on
how to shape effective public messages. OEF is also regularly
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delivered to the Commissione Nazionale per la Prevenzione e
Previsione dei Grandi Rischi (the Grand Risk Commission),
which provides the Italian government with expert advice
about natural hazards and their associated risks. INGV is also
collaborating with a consortium of seismic engineering depart-
ments in Italy, to move from OEF to operational earthquake
loss forecasting, which produces loss metrics, such as the ex-
pected number of collapsed buildings, displaced residents, in-
juries, and fatalities (Iervolino et al., 2015).
OEF in New Zealand has been developed for end users
ranging from the public to government decision makers. The
system combines short-term, medium-term, and long-term
models to forecast both event probabilities and ground-motion
hazard for time frames of 1 day to 50 years. This hybrid model
has been used to inform rebuilding decisions in Christchurch,
which was severely damaged during the Darfield aftershock se-
quence in 2011 and subsequently has upgraded its building de-
sign standards. For more recent events, aftershock scenario
earthquakes also have been provided to help end users interpret
the forecasts (e.g., GNS Science, 2014).
A few key points were emphasized repeatedly during the
introductory presentations. First, long-term forecasts, which
are applicable from decades to centuries, represent our first line
of defense for mitigating earthquake risk, primarily by inform-
ing building codes. Also, Omori–Utsu-based statistical cluster-
ing models have demonstrable reliability and skill with respect
to short-term triggering and therefore provide a rational basis
for short-term OEFs. However, the primary challenge to useful-
ness is that triggering models usually estimate a low probability
for damaging earthquakes (Jordan et al., 2011). Probability gains
may be as great as factors of 1000, but the overall likelihood of
triggering damaging events will typically be less than a few per-
cent. The exceptions are during aftershock sequences of very large
(M >7) earthquakes, when this probability can climb above 10%.
Such low-to-moderate probabilities will constitute useful informa-
tion if the potential consequences of large triggered events are
high (e.g., Marzocchi et al., 2015). That said, about half of all
large damaging earthquakes lack any detectable foreshocks, mean-
ing they will occur without potential warning (e.g., Agnew and
Jones, 1991). OEF can also produce high-probability forecasts for
Table 1
Potential Products that Could Be Produced Either Directly by an Operational Earthquake Forecast System or by Further
Processing in Downstream Risk Calculations
Product/Metric Description
Magnitude probability distribution The likelihood of having earthquakes of different magnitudes in a given area and for a
specified time span
Spatial distribution of triggering Specifying where triggered events are most likely to occur
Fault triggering probabilities A prioritized list of faults that could nucleate or participate in large triggered events,
accounting for any elastic-rebound effects
Full earthquake rupture forecast (ERF) Specifying the likelihood of all possible events (at some discretization level) for a given
time span
Stochastic event sets Synthetic catalogs of triggered events as implied by an ERF
Hazard estimates The probability of exceeding hazard-related intensity measures (e.g., PGA, PGV, PGD,
SA, MMI) as a function of time and space*
Sequence duration Time needed for some measure (e.g., earthquake rate) to drop back to some level
Scenario earthquakes Representative examples of earthquakes that could be triggered
Ground deformation probabilities Forecast of future fault offsets (e.g., due to creep) and/or other types of ground
deformation
Landslide probabilities The likelihood of triggering landslides
Liquefaction probabilities The likelihood of triggering liquefaction
Hazard-Risk Separation Interface
Population and/or infrastructure
exposed
The number of people, houses, commercial properties, schools, hospitals, etc. with a
certain likelihood of experiencing certain shaking or other hazard thresholds
Deaths/injuries/hospitalizations Risk estimates with respect to human physical health and survival
Damage level and collapse probability Loss and collapse estimates with respect to built infrastructure
Downtime Likelihood and length of disruption to business, power, water, waste disposal,
telecommunication, and communication systems
Inspection priority or concern level A customized and prioritized list of assets that may require attention (e.g., as provided
by the ShakeCast system)
Each product will constitute an estimate in that uncertainties will need to be quantified.
*PGA, peak ground acceleration; PGV, peak ground velocity; PGD, peak ground displacement; SA, Spectral acceleration; MMI,
modified Mercalli intensity.
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smaller aftershocks that are felt but cause little damage; under-
standing that such events are to be expected can be reassuring in
the aftermath of a large earthquake (Wein and Becker, 2013). As
stated by Saathoff and Everly (2002, p. 249), “better than any
medication we know, [reliable] information treats anxiety in a
crisis.”
Decisions to undertake mitigation actions based on OEF
information depend on the balance between costs and benefits,
which are specific to the risk at hand. Because these decisions
are contingent on a host of economic, political, and psycho-
logical considerations that lie beyond the science of hazard
analysis, scientific information about future earthquake activity
should be developed independent of any specific risk assess-
ment or mitigation effort. Moreover, all validated OEF infor-
mation should be made available to all potential users in a
timely manner (although perhaps tailored for different user
groups). These principles of hazard-risk separation and trans-
parency imply that seismologists should provide potential end
users with complete, probabilistic forecasts, including the epi-
stemic uncertainties (Jordan et al., 2014). Ideally, OEF systems
should be policy neutral; that is, they should not involve de-
cisions to withhold information until some activity or proba-
bility threshold is exceeded (as in a deterministic prediction), or
until a “significant” mainshock has occurred, because doing so
would not only imply that we know how to define these things
for all potential users, but would also effectively put scientists
in the inappropriate role of making policy decisions.
Recent events have underscored the public’s hunger for OEF
information during active earthquake sequences, with expecta-
tions rising with the proliferation of social networking. It is well
known that information vacuums invite unfounded predictions
and misinformation (e.g., Mileti and Peek, 2000), such as the
rumors on Twitter that “experts are holding back on a prediction
to avoid panic” within hours of the 2010 El Mayor–Cucapah
earthquake (Jordan and Jones, 2010). The level of certainty pro-
vided by amateur predictors can also be particularly attractive
and therefore distracting (e.g., Marzocchi, 2012).
The infamous L’Aquila trial, in which seven Italian officials
were charged with involuntary manslaughter, was at least partly a
consequence of miscommunications about earthquake risk by
the Italian Department of Civil Protection. That agency con-
vened its Grand Risk Commission before the L’Aquila earth-
quake to address ill-founded earthquake predictions that were
worrying the public during the active seismic sequence preceding
the L’Aquila mainshock, but it lacked the operational capabilities
to accurately assess and report the evolving seismic hazard (Mar-
zocchi, 2012). The best solution in such predicaments is to have
an OEF system that produces authoritative, scientific informa-
tion (Jordan et al., 2011; Jordan, 2013).
OEF PRODUCTS
Table 1 lists a variety of information that could be estimated for
either naturally triggered or human-induced earthquakes. These
range from relatively simple earthquake-probability statements
to loss estimates. The most complete forecast information from
an OEF standpoint would be a suite of earthquake rupture fore-
casts (ERFs), each giving the probability of every possible event
(at some approximation level) for a given time span, with the
alternative ERFs in the suite representing epistemic uncertainties.
The workshop reviewed progress on the OEF model being
developed for California, in which an ETAS-based spatiotem-
poral clustering component is being added to the Third
Uniform California Earthquake Rupture Forecast (UCERF3;
Field et al., 2014, 2015); this combined model is referred to as
UCERF3-ETAS. The main goals for this earthquake rupture
forecast (ERF) are to (1) relax segmentation assumptions and
include multifault ruptures; (2) include both elastic rebound
and spatiotemporal clustering together, as is apparently needed
to get realistic behavior (Field, 2012); and (3) support the gen-
eration of synthetic earthquake catalogs (stochastic event sets)
for improved model testing and to enable full probability dis-
tributions to be quantified for hazard and loss metrics (rather
than providing just mean estimates).
We also reviewed a variety of USGS real-time products
that may be relevant to OEF. For example, the Prompt Assess-
ment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER) system
(Wald et al., 2010) provides fatality and economic-consequence
estimates following significant earthquakes worldwide, and the
ShakeCast system (Wald et al., 2008) sends automatic notifi-
cations to registered users indicating the level of shaking and
likely impacts given the location and fragility of their particular
facilities. Should these capabilities be extended to forecast
equivalent losses due to possibly triggered events? Such calcu-
lations would be nontrivial because, rather than considering
just the single event that has occurred, one must integrate losses
over every earthquake in every possible sequence of events that
could follow, at least in some approximate way.
The calculations can be made more efficient by precom-
puting losses for all possible events defined by the forecast
model, as was demonstrated at the workshop using the
UCERF3-ETAS prototype. Loss estimates for model-derived
aftershock sequences will be more uncertain than those for
the actual earthquakes monitored by PAGER, because the lat-
ter usually have well-estimated magnitudes and often observed
ground-motion constraints. Presentations were given on the
range of current loss-modeling capabilities within the USGS
and on factors that might need to be considered in such cal-
culations (such as mainshock damage increasing structural fra-
gility or changes in replacement costs due to increased demand
for building materials following a damaging event). The utility
of operational earthquake loss forecasting is expected to be
highest for applications in which the risk tolerance is smallest,
as in the case of critical facilities. When the probabilities are
low and the uncertainties are large, it may be more appropriate
to focus on simpler loss metrics, such as the number of people
exposed to different hazard levels.
Other common themes from these introductory presenta-
tions included the difficulty in going from a prototype capability
to a fully operational system, the need to identify and support
early adopters, the importance of a flexible and iterative develop-
ment process with appropriate performance feedback loops, and
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that success with users will require considerable time and re-
source commitments. Finally, several participants highlighted
the need for carefully crafted and well-timed communication
protocols.
USERS AND USES OF OEF
The workshop identified and discussed the following potential
users and uses, and we expect more to emerge as OEF capabil-
ities become available.
Public Preparedness
Simple low-cost actions that can be taken by the public based
on OEF include (1) checking food, water, medical supplies, and
cash on hand, and keeping phones charged and gas in the car;
(2) reviewing family emergency plans; (3) securing household
objects; and (4) perhaps evaluating the overall structural integ-
rity of dwellings. Following the Christchurch earthquake,
other relevant decisions concerned whether to relocate to other
areas and when to start rebuilding damaged homes (Becker
et al., 2015). OEF could also trigger preemptive mitigation
efforts such as considering structural retrofits and earthquake
insurance options.
Routine OEF would also provide “teachable moments”—
opportunities for earthquake preparedness education (Mileti
and Peek, 2002). Outweighing concerns that regular messaging
will numb the public or the demonstrable cost of false alarms
(Simmons and Sutter, 2009), studies have shown that our sense
of risk decays over time and that repetition is therefore impor-
tant for effective messaging (Brickman and Campbell, 1971;
Mileti and Darlington, 1995). This need for reinforcement
is especially true for the even-lower long-term earthquake prob-
abilities associated with less-active (normal) times. Low risk
leads to less personal earthquake experience and a lower sense
of threat and vulnerability (e.g., Mileti and Darlington, 1995),
making it harder to compete for attention with the other risks
people are facing. OEF could also counter the tendency for
an affected population to downplay the future aftershock risk
based on perceptions that the worst has already occurred (Wein
et al., 2015).
Proper messaging is paramount, especially because warn-
ings that lack information about which actions should be taken
are ineffective or even counterproductive (Mileti and Soren-
son, 1990; Mileti, 1999). Timing of different content is also
important. For example, immediately following the Christ-
church earthquake, the public showed little capacity to react to
aftershock forecasts, because they were busy dealing with the
crisis. However, their appetite for quantitative information in-
creased as the incident evolved from the response phase to re-
covery and preparedness modes (Wein et al., 2015).
The Christchurch and L’Aquila earthquakes exemplified
the potential psychological benefits of OEF, especially with
respect to reassuring the public that the sequences were not
scientifically surprising (e.g., Wein and Becker, 2013). Trans-
parency and full disclosure are also important to empower peo-
ple, because transparency, trust, and confidence in authorities
are essential for effective risk communication and management
(e.g., Siegrist and Zingg, 2014).
Transparency and full disclosure include providing quan-
titative information, and there is ample evidence that there is a
demand for this. For example, after the Christchurch earth-
quake one resident stated, “My mother-in-law was in the CTV
building [which collapsed], and she spent 12 weeks in the hos-
pital. She prefers to see the numbers.” Having more quantita-
tive information allows people to make more nuanced choices
based on their own level of risk tolerance, influencing decisions
such as minimizing the time spent in vulnerable buildings
by sleeping outside, which is common in Italy, or whether to
modify travel plans to an area with elevated hazard. For some
people, numbers provide comfort even if they are not fully
understood, because they indicate that scientists understand
what is happening. Going further, a particularly savvy home-
owner might even want a loss-exceedance curve for their dwell-
ing to enable a more informed decision between spending
money on retrofits versus earthquake insurance.
Some Christchurch residents were stressed by OEF fore-
casts that extended the time span beyond days and weeks to
months and years when they were busy struggling to recover
from the earthquake. Furthermore, some people were frus-
trated by the predominant and continued use of probabilities
in aftershock forecasts (Wein et al., 2015). A well-known
psychological phenomenon is “probability neglect” (Sunstein,
2003): bad outcomes attract attention and evoke emotional
responses, which can result in people ignoring the actual like-
lihood of the event. People who find processing numerical in-
formation challenging are more susceptible to these types of
biases (Peters et al., 2006). Nevertheless, probabilistic informa-
tion appears, on balance, to improve decision making (Joslyn
and LeClerc, 2012; Peters et al., 2014), but it is important to
communicate early and often and to evaluate message effective-
ness, especially with respect to members of the community who
may misinterpret, misuse, or even fear the content. We know
that people respond positively to consistent, authoritative
statements from multiple sources about the specific actions
they should take, even when the future is highly uncertain
(e.g., Mileti and Darlington, 1995). One approach is to utilize
well-established best practices with respect to message design,
such as the internalization–distribution–explanation–action
(IDEA) model of Sellnow and Sellnow (2013) and Sellnow
et al. (2015).
Public messaging is most effective when it includes recom-
mended actions (Mileti and Sorenson, 1990; Mileti, 1999). In
particular, Christchurch residents reported that, during the cri-
sis of a damaging earthquake, they could not think clearly and
needed reminders of what protective actions to take and how
to get help (Wein et al., 2015). However, given the hazard-risk
separation principle, any actionable recommendations would
not come from the scientists operating the OEF system, but
from entities that have a statutory responsibility for making
such recommendations, such as emergency managers, including
the Federal Emergency Management Agency or the California
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES). To
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include such information in the messages issued by the OEF
system will require coordination with the emergency managers,
such as was done as part of the Parkfield Earthquake Prediction
Experiment. Findings from the Canterbury earthquake se-
quence study of communication confirms this need for coor-
dinated message content and, furthermore, identifies the need
to include psychosocial support messaging from social services
or welfare agencies (Wein et al., 2015). These coordinated
messages can then be broadcast by the news media.
In short, OEF can nudge people toward taking actions that
will minimize their risks. A carefully crafted, predefined, and
tested communication protocol is vital, because the chaotic
aftermath of damaging earthquakes is a particularly bad time
to design and deploy new messages.
OFFICIAL ADVISORY COUNCILS
OEF can provide useful information to entities like the
NEPEC, which advises the USGS Director on earthquake
threats, and the California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation
Council (CEPEC), which similarly advises CalOES. Follow-
ing major California earthquakes, for example, CEPEC gen-
erally, although not consistently, adheres to a notification
protocol that has probability-based alert levels. CEPEC cur-
rently relies on generic probabilities or ad hoc estimates cal-
culated informally, rather than on an automated, customized,
and well-tested forecasting system. The evaluation protocols
are also time consuming, requiring the scheduling of meetings
or teleconferences. Moreover, the use of the alerts also varies.
For example, the 2001 M 4.1 Bombay Beach earthquake
led to a formal advisory from the state, whereas the 2009
M 4.8 Bombay Beach earthquake did not, in spite of the latter
being larger and closer to the San Andreas fault (Jordan and
Jones, 2010).
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Emergency managers exist at various levels of government,
from federal to local, as well as within various private organ-
izations. Each level has somewhat different needs for OEF, de-
pending on their response capabilities and requirements. Larger
organizations with a greater number of staff or responsibility
for critical infrastructure may wish to receive more detailed and
more frequent information compared to smaller departments.
In lower-probability environments (e.g., following anM 5
earthquake near the San Andreas fault), emergency manage-
ment uses of OEF might include reiterating recommended
preparedness measures, conducting disaster-response drills, in-
creasing the readiness of emergency equipment and personnel,
mitigating nonstructural risks, completing communications
checks, and emphasizing earthquake preparedness in media
messaging. OEF could also guide other emergency management
decisions, such as during the Faenza, Italy, earthquake swarm,
where tents were provided to those who did not feel safe in
their homes (Jordan et al., 2014).
In higher-probability environments (e.g., following a
larger, perhaps damaging earthquake), OEF could also be used
as a basis for locating shelters and emergency equipment away
from higher-hazard areas and deciding when risks have decayed
enough or sufficient risk-reduction measures have been imple-
mented to initiate search and rescue, building inspection, and
demolition activities. For instance, after the 1989 Loma Prieta
earthquake, a small earthquake occurred on the Hayward fault
near the damaged Cypress freeway. Based on a discussion of
aftershock clustering, demolition activities were suspended
for several hours and the workers were redeployed to other ac-
tivities. In more extreme circumstances, OEF could influence
decisions regarding cordoned-off areas, the identification of
safe zones, state-of-emergency declarations, and evacuation no-
tices. For example, in Christchurch, aftershocks were factored
into cordoning decisions, although this could have been man-
aged even better had more information been available (Becker
et al., 2015). OEF may be very useful to establish when people
can reoccupy buildings after an event. For example, after the
first of two 2012 earthquakes in northern Italy, one of the most
pressing questions was when people could return to work.
Emergency managers at the workshop emphasized the
need for quantitative information and even expressed frus-
tration in getting vague proclamations from scientists over the
phone. They also expressed concerns about undertaking costly
activities if the hazard probabilities are small or if the confi-
dence in the forecast is low. This justifiable reluctance empha-
sizes the need for complete, authoritative, reliable, and timely
information (although perhaps delivered at varying levels of
detail). Because the range of uses of OEF will be broad in terms
of technical sophistication, the emergency managers also empha-
sized that success will require training before, during, and after
the launch of any functioning OEF system. A few emergency
management needs are elaborated below.
California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES)
The CalOES is responsible for overseeing and coordinating
emergency preparedness, response, and recovery within the
state, and it is required by statute to provide information
on increased earthquake probabilities and suggested mitigation
actions. The information on earthquake likelihoods currently
comes from CEPEC, as described previously. CalOES advises
on recommended protective actions via different products for
three audiences: government, media, and the public.
School Systems
A representative from the Los Angeles Unified School District
(LAUSD) identified several possible uses of OEF by educa-
tional institutions:
• Push out preparedness messaging to all staff and schools
(check emergency supplies, review protocols with staff, up-
date emergency plan, print student rosters, and practice
drop-cover-hold-on with students).
• Notify facilities maintenance and operations for critical in-
frastructure issues, preplanning, and staging of equipment.
• Notify the Office of Environmental Health and Safety,
District Nursing, Student Medical Services, and Informa-
tion Technology.
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• Notify the Los Angeles School Police Department; they
may go on tactical alert and cancel regular days off and
scheduled vacation days.
• Notify transportation (school buses).
• Notify food services (to accelerate food delivery schedule
or send extra food).
• Notify Beyond the Bell, so that after-school programs and
overnight camps are aware and prepared.
• Cancel travel or field trips to any areas of possible impact.
• Test radio operations at all schools and facilities and that
are assigned to vehicles and personnel.
• Activate the Emergency Operations Center at an appro-
priate tactical level.
• Notify parents to have them review family emergency
plans, including reunification locations, update emergency
cards, including the names of those authorized to pick up
students, and access other information (e.g., the LAUSD
emergency plan app for mobile devices).
This list represents a good window into the wide range of
concerns and activities that large organizations might need to
consider. However, LAUSD is a very large school district, com-
prising 650,000 kindergarten–twelfth grade students spread
over 710 square miles, so some of these uses may not be appli-
cable to smaller educational institutions.
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)
The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)
manages more the 50,000 miles of state highways, freeways,
and bridges. One of the main concerns regarding earthquakes
is the need to keep transportation lines open following a large
damaging event so that overall rescue and recovery operations
can proceed as smoothly as possible. In general, Caltrans could
use OEF as described for emergency managers above but with
some transportation-related specifics, such as developing rout-
ing maps and defining possible detours for disaster supply
chains. They could also conduct ShakeCast-type analyses of
their infrastructure given the complete forecast or for some
representative scenario earthquakes, which would enable repri-
oritization to address their more vulnerable structures in both
near- and long-term planning.
OEFwill be most informative, in terms of exhibiting the high-
est probability gains, just after a large earthquake has occurred; so
it remains to be seen how useful OEF will be to Caltrans when
they are busy evaluating damage from a given event. Caltrans cur-
rently has predictive models for fire (FireCast) and is developing a
system for flooding (FloodCast), so incorporating OEF would fit
in well with how they address other perils (and note that the cast
in FireCast and FloodCast is short for forecast, whereas that in
ShakeCast is short for broadcast). As with the emergency manag-
ers discussed above, Caltrans participants also expressed the impor-
tance of getting full, quantitative, and robust information from an
OEF system, including quantification of uncertainties.
Utility Companies
OEF could also be of use to electricity providers, water depart-
ments, dam operators, waste and sanitation companies, refin-
eries, and communication providers (radio, TV, cable, cellular,
and satellite). Power and water/wastewater critical infrastruc-
ture affected by the Canterbury earthquake sequence demon-
strated the use of OEF in decisions about sizing the response of
the labor force, when to repair nonstructural damage, where to
lay new transmission and distribution lines, and repair scope
and design standards (Becker et al., 2015). Utility representa-
tives attending the workshop described uses for OEF similar to
those described above for emergency management. Unique ac-
tivities identified here include delaying high-risk maintenance
activities, such as pulling nuclear rods at a nuclear power plant.
Any significant changes in longer-term hazard might also be an
important consideration for some utilities, as expressed by a
representative from Pacific Gas and Electric. This representa-
tive also expressed concern with the threat posed to pipelines
and other facilities due to postseismic deformation and/or the
triggering of landslides from aftershocks; while quantifying
such hazards is theoretically feasible, it is probably beyond
the scope of a first-generation OEF system.
Hospitals
The potential use of OEF in hospitals or other medical facilities
is similar to that described for emergency managers. Some
domain-specific actions that could be taken include activation
of hospital command centers, postponing high-risk outpatient
treatment and elective surgery until shaking hazards have
adequately subsided, or using demand-surge forecasts to decide
whether to recall staff and stage mobile hospital tents and
medical supplies for use as triage and treatment areas in case
a large triggered event causes an influx of injured victims. Other
actions include reevaluating the threat to oxygen, water, and
power supplies, the loss of which would significantly reduce
the ability of a hospital to provide care and could require ac-
tivation of plans to relocate essential services or to evacuate.
Postearthquake Building Inspection and Tagging
Reentry of buildings is highly desirable after an earthquake,
especially if they are one’s home or place of work. However, doing
so can be dangerous, especially if there has been structural damage
and/or there is a significant probability of damaging aftershocks.
Consequently, government officials, or engineers deputized by
those officials, evaluate questionable structures and generally ap-
ply a color-coded tag: red if unsafe, yellow if fit for restricted use,
and green if the building’s seismic safety has not been signifi-
cantly compromised.
The evaluator often uses procedures documented in
ATC-20-1 (Applied Technology Council, 2005) to determine
if damaged, or potentially damaged, buildings are safe for con-
tinued use. Buildings are tagged unsafe if earthquake damage
has caused the structural system to lose capacity and make the
building much more likely to collapse in an aftershock. In ad-
dition to prioritizing building evaluations to minimize the risk
to inspectors, OEF could also be used to apply time-varying
inspection results, where a building tagged as red might evolve
into yellow as the hazard subsides. Proposed procedures for this
have already been published (Yeo and Cornell, 2008; Luco
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et al., 2011), and implementing such a capability has been
identified as a priority by the Applied Technology Council
(Gallagher et al., 1999).
Zoning and Building Codes
The Christchurch earthquake is the best example of how OEF
can influence longer-term zoning, relocation, and building-
code decisions. The New Zealand OEF model, which produces
forecasts with time spans from one year to decades, was part of a
suite of information used in defining zones for land retirement
(no rebuilding) in liquefaction- and rock-fall-susceptible areas of
Christchurch. The same OEF model with a 50 yr time span was
used to revise the building design guidelines for the Canterbury
region (Gerstenberger et al., 2014; Becker et al., 2015).
Oil and Natural Gas Regulation
Although induced seismicity was not the main focus of our
meeting, an obvious potential use of OEF is in the regulation
of oil and gas industry activities, especially in regard to the seis-
mic hazards induced by wastewater injection. For example, one
such regulatory body, theTexas Railroad Commission, recently
proposed rules that would allow them to modify, suspend, or
terminate a permit “if injection is likely to be or determined to
be causing seismic activity.” Clearly having an authoritative
source of seismicity information would benefit such activities.
Moreover, having an objective model that can define the rel-
ative likelihood that an event was induced versus natural would
presumably be informative in any damage-liability litigation.
Regulatory actions are typically taken when an earthquake
is detected within some distance of an active well. However, it
is not the earthquake itself that causes concern, but the pos-
sibility of deaths and/or economic losses from a possibly trig-
gered larger event. OEF could therefore provide the basis for
more advanced loss modeling, whereby regulators might weigh
probabilistic losses against the economic consequences of halt-
ing operations.
Insurance Industry and Capital Markets
One perhaps underappreciated use of OEF involves the insur-
ance industry and capital markets. Most people know about
earthquake insurance and although OEF would seem like a ra-
tional basis for modifying premiums (because savvy consumers
could game the system annually), the regulatory process for
changing rates charged to consumers typically takes years, mak-
ing yearly rate adjustments impractical at this time. Another
product is reinsurance, which enables an insurance company
to pass some of their risk along to another insurance entity,
increasing the likelihood of remaining solvent should a large
event occur. Companies have more flexibility with respect to
changing their reinsurance levels than with changing rates
charged to customers, so it is here that OEF could be more useful.
For example, consider a statewide earthquake insurance
provider holding $5 billion in capital (from selling premiums),
plus another $5 billion in reinsurance, implying a total claim-
paying capacity of $10 billion. In terms of remaining financially
solvent, the company is at risk if one or more earthquakes cause a
total payout that exceeds this $10 billion capacity. Suppose the
company has a risk tolerance of 1 chance in 500 per year, mean-
ing anything greater than a 0.2% chance of exceeding the payout
capacity in any given year is unacceptable. Modeling losses using
a long-term earthquake forecast such as UCERF3 could imply
that they are within their risk tolerance. However, OEF-based
losses following an M 5.5 event near the San Andreas fault
may very well push the probability of exceeding $10 billion well
above 0.2% over the next year, at which time the company might
want to purchase more reinsurance (and the companies provid-
ing the latter would want to adjust their premiums as well).
A more subtle use of OEFmight be in defining and under-
standing insurance policy deductibles. For example, one
California insurance provider considers all earthquakes within
a 15-day window as a seismic event for the purpose of handling
deductibles. Consider the case in which a mainshock has pro-
duced damage that exceeds the deductible, which is typically
15%–20% of the home’s replacement cost. The 15-day rule
means that losses incurred from a damaging aftershock on day
14 would be covered in full, but those from an event on day 16
would only be covered by the amount exceeding the deductible.
This is not to imply that such rules lack rationality, but that
OEF-based loss modeling could be useful in exploring whether
there are any unintended consequences or whether there may
be more optimal ways of handling triggered events. Another
use of OEF, as exemplified after the Christchurch earthquake,
is to help decide when insurance-supported repairs and recon-
struction can begin, given the possibility of triggered events.
Catastrophe bonds (“cat bonds”) are another financial
instrument available for managing risk. They are a type of
insurance-linked security made available through capital
markets. Their purpose is similar to reinsurance except that the
risk is passed along to other types of investors, typically those
looking to diversify their portfolios because natural disasters
are less correlated with other financial market trends. Cat
bonds were first created and used following Hurricane Andrew
in 1992 and the 1994 Northridge earthquake. The market has
since grown significantly. For example, more than $300 million
in earthquake cat bonds were issued in the first quarter of 2015
alone, implying an annual value of $1.2 billion.
These markets are a prime potential user of OEF, because
they literally place large financial bets on whether or not certain
regions will be struck by earthquakes. Commercial loss-modeling
companies would likely remain the primary interface between an
OEF system and such markets, either by providing actual loss es-
timates, or by providing clients with access to loss-modeling soft-
ware. Our workshop included several representatives from this
industry. They expressed enthusiasm about the OEF possibilities
but also emphasized the need for reliable, authoritative, consistent,
timely, and well-tested information, especially given the poten-
tially litigious marketplace. They also need complete earthquake
rupture forecasts, including uncertainties, in a well-defined and
usable format. With such needs, these entities would be one group
of power users of an OEF system, with the ultimate goal being to
help maximize the resilience of individuals, financial institutions,
and perhaps most importantly, cities and communities.
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Other Potential Users and Uses
Other potential user groups were discussed at the workshop,
including banks, energy distributors (gas stations), grocery
stores, home supply centers, and financial futures markets. The
primary use identified here amounts to ensuring that goods
and services can be provided following any triggered earth-
quakes. For example, a bank might choose to restock their
ATMs sooner than otherwise planned. Other potential con-
sumers include: any OEF-information remarketers; nongovern-
mental organizations concerned with the public welfare, such
as the American Red Cross and GeoHazards International; so-
cial service providers; and scientific organizations, such as the
USGS. One scientific application of OEF is the conditioning of
earthquake early-warning systems to expect future earthquakes
in regions of increased seismic activity.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The range of past OEF uses and new applications discussed at
the workshop and outlined in this report shows that OEF has
many potential applications, even considering the challenges of
establishing an effective system for all potential users. As noted
in the context of Caltrans, OEF is going to be most informative
in terms of higher probability gains following larger damaging
events, and it is not yet clear how to best dovetail OEF infor-
mation with postearthquake information and activities.
We certainly do not want OEF to be a distraction from any
disaster-response measures, nor a source of confusion in what
may already be a high-anxiety environment. That caveat noted,
attendees at the workshop concluded that OEF has clear po-
tential value, especially with respect to reminding the public
to be ready, helping emergency managers and operators of criti-
cal infrastructure to prepare, and informing financial risk-man-
agement entities.
The proper role of OEF is to inform, but not prescribe, the
response to changing seismic hazards and risk, and to serve a
broad range of user types. Decisions about mitigation actions
need to be made by proper authorities, such as emergency man-
agers, and psychosocial support needs to be administered by
appropriate organizations. In terms of enabling users to make
informed decisions quickly in crisis situations, especially with
respect to more technical content, training needs to start well
before any actionable earthquake. This and the other guidelines
for effective communication discussed here are also addressed
in further detail by Perry et al. (2015).
With the potential uses of OEF hereby identified, sub-
sequent workshops will address the appropriate scientific models,
operationalization challenges (including real-time access to high-
performance computing), model verification and validation, and
the effectiveness of OEF communications and products.
DATA AND RESOURCES
Railroad Commission of Texas Mission Statement is available at
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us (last accessed April 2015). Informa-
tion regarding the Catastrophe bonds (“cat bonds”) are available
at http://www.artemis.bm (last accessed April 2015). National
Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (NEPEC) reports is
available at http://earthquake.usgs.gov/aboutus/nepec/reports/
NEPEC_advice_OEF_Dec2015.pdf (last accessed January 2016).
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